Union bargaining power, labour standards and foreign direct investment by Leahy, Dermot & Montagna, Catia
                                                              
University of Dundee
Union bargaining power, labour standards and foreign direct investment
Leahy, Dermot; Montagna, Catia
Publication date:
2004
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Leahy, D., & Montagna, C. (2004). Union bargaining power, labour standards and foreign direct investment.
(Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 168). University of Dundee.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Mar. 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Economic Studies, 
University of Dundee, 
Dundee. 
DD1 4HN 
 
 
Dundee Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNION BARGAINING POWER, LABOUR 
STANDARDS AND FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
 
 
 
Dermot Leahy  
and  
Catia Montagna 
                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Working Paper 
 No. 168 
July 2004 
ISSN:1473-236X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a  University College Dublin   
b University of Dundee and Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, University of 
Nottingham. 
 
UNION BARGAINING POWER, LABOUR STANDARDS 
AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
 
Dermot Leahya and Catia Montagnab 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2004 
 
Abstract   
This paper examines Foreign Direct Investment in the presence of labour unions.  An 
oligopoly model is developed in which identical firms locate in a host country in order to 
export to a foreign country.  These firms are unionised and compete with foreign firms on 
the foreign market.  We consider the incentives for social dumping via restrictive labour 
legislation which we assume can be used by the host country government to affect the 
bargaining power of unions.  We ask whether it is in the interest of the importing foreign 
country for the host country to relax or to tighten labour laws. 
(100 words) 
 
JEL classification: F12, L13 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Unions, Labour Legislation, Social 
Dumping, Exports.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding author:    Catia Montagna, Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee, 3 Perth 
Road, Dundee, DD1 4HN, U.K.  tel: (+)44-1382-344845, fax: (+)44-1382-34691    
e-mail: c.montagna@dundee.ac.uk  
 1
Union Bargaining Power, Social Dumping, and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
1.  Introduction 
A fundamental issue in the debate surrounding globalisation concerns the extent to which 
inter-country differences in labour standards distort the international allocation of 
resources.  In advanced industrial economies there is a fear that – by making use of cheap 
labour and lax labour market regulations – developing countries may be able to enjoy 
unfair advantages over competitors, not only in international trade but also in their ability to 
attract and/or retain investment.  Given the alleged importance of labour costs in 
determining the location choice of multinational firms (MNEs), labour interests in 
industrial countries warn of the dangers of a race-to-the-bottom in social standards as 
governments may be tempted to actively relax regulatory frameworks to compete for jobs.  
Indeed, calls for a formal incorporation of the issue of labour standards into WTO trade 
liberalisation negotiations have systematically been met by resistance by developing 
countries, who perceive international pressures for the establishment of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms to their labour practices as forms of hidden protectionism.  
 The aim of this paper is to illuminate issues raised within this debate by examining 
the implications of the use of labour market legislation on (i) a (developing) country’s 
ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and (ii) on the conflict of interest that 
might arise between a country that hosts export oriented FDI and an importing country with 
respect to levels of labour market regulation.  
 Cost and labour market flexibility considerations rank high amongst the determinants 
of the location decisions of internationally mobile firms and are often entwined with 
concerns about market access, i.e. with the desire to gain access to another market that may 
otherwise be difficult to penetrate.  For instance, US and Japanese firms wishing to gain 
access to European Union markets will often try to locate in the lower wage southern 
periphery or in the flexible labour markets of the UK and Ireland and use them as an export 
base to avoid the common external tariffs imposed by the European Union.  Similarly, 
European firms may locate in Mexico to export to the US.  Often, in situations such as this, 
the main objective of FDI is not to serve the host country’s market, and the vast bulk of the 
multinationals’ output is exported to a foreign market1.   
                                                          
1  See Barry and Bradley (1997) for the Irish case. 
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 In this paper we shall be concerned with FDI that occurs for both the labour cost and 
the market access reasons, and develop a framework that enables us to capture the conflict 
of interest that emerges between industrialised and developing countries when firms in the 
former compete – for their own domestic market – with MNEs located in countries where 
labour costs are lower.   In such a situation, incentives may arise in the industrialised 
country to bring accusations of social dumping against the country that hosts the MNEs if 
in the latter labour standards are lower than in the former.    
 We set up an oligopoly model of ‘export-platform’ FDI in which identical 
multinational firms locate in a host country (which can be thought of as an LDC) in order to 
export to the market of a foreign industrial economy where they face competition from 
indigenous firms.  The multinationals, owned by residents of a third country, repatriate all 
their profits and, once located in the host country, face unionised labour markets.  
Unionisation generates a trade-off for the host country’s government: on the one hand 
unions represent a means to extract rents from foreign multinationals; on the other, to the 
extent that it results in higher firms’ costs, unionisation may discourage inward FDI.  In an 
attempt to attract investment, the host country government may thus have an incentive to 
limit unions’ power.  Governments’ engagement in social dumping may however be 
perceived as unfair by foreign competitors, particularly where concerns about employment 
exist.  
 We consider the host country’s government’s incentives for restricting union 
legislation and engaging in social dumping motivated by a desire to attract FDI.   To this 
end, we assume that the host country government has the power to affect the bargaining 
power of the unions through legislation.  We also assume that unemployment exists in both 
countries and ask whether it is in the interest of the importing country for the host country 
to relax or to tighten labour laws.   
 The literature on labour standards and international trade does not normally treat 
labour standards as policy variables, even when – as for example in Casella (1996) – they 
are endogenously determined2.  Similarly, those contributions that explore the relationship 
between labour market institutions and FDI typically ignore the possibility of the 
government’s (strategic) use of union legislation3.  As a notable exception, Leahy and 
Montagna (2000b) analyse a host country government’s incentives to legalise unions when 
MNEs benefit from dynamic effects.  
                                                          
2  A notable exception is Bagwell and Staiger (2001). 
3   See for instance: Zhao (1995, 1988), Naylor and Santoni (1998), Leahy and Montagna (2000a). 
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 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. In Section 3, we 
examine the incentives faced by the host country to tighten union legislation and engage in 
some form of social dumping.  We also analyse the implications of such policies for the 
foreign importing country which is concerned with both unemployment and with consumer 
surplus.  In Section, 4 we consider an extension of the model.  Section 5 concludes the 
paper.   
 
2.  The Model 
We develop a partial equilibrium oligopoly model of ‘export-platform’ FDI that consists of 
three countries which we refer to as the ‘host’, ‘importing’ and ‘third’ country respectively.  
Multinationals locate in the host country and use it exclusively as an export base to serve 
the importing country market4.  We assume that exports to the latter are only viable once 
the multinationals are located in the host country, which can be thought of as a developing 
country that enjoys geographical proximity and/or a preferential trading agreement with the 
importing country.  The importing country, where indigenous firms also produce the good, 
can be thought of as a mature industrial economy characterised by factors such as high 
labour costs and rigid labour markets (e.g. strict employment protection laws) that make it 
an unattractive location for footloose firms and that make it too costly for its firms to 
relocate.  We shall therefore assume that (i) MNEs do not locate in the importing country 
and (ii) the importing country’s firms do not relocate to the host country5.   The third 
country can be thought of as the rest of the world, from which the MNEs originate.  Apart 
from acting as a source of FDI, this country plays no other role in the analysis. 
  The MNEs are symmetric in every respect and the number of these firms that set up in 
the host country is represented by N which is endogenously determined.  The host country 
is unionised and each MNE bargains with a single union over the wage to be paid to the 
homogenous labour it employs.  The wage paid by the i-th multinational is given by iw  and 
the quantity it produces is iq .  To simplify, we assume labour is the only factor used in 
production and we normalise the input requirement of the typical MNE at unity so that iw  
is the MNE’s marginal production cost.  The MNE must also incur a (non labour) fixed 
location cost F that can be thought of as encompassing both the plant fixed costs and other 
                                                          
4  This export platform setting is as in Lahiri and Ono (2003). 
5  Allowing for these firms to become multinationals and/or relocate to the host country would not 
qualitatively alter the welfare results of the paper. 
 4
fixed opportunity costs such as the reservation profit level (which will depend on profit 
opportunities in the rest of the world).   
  We assume that a fixed number M of symmetric firms are already located in the 
importing country.  Each of these firms uses labour as the only input and has a constant 
marginal cost denoted by ω.  To start with, we assume away importing-country unions as 
we wish to focus on the role of union bargaining power in the host country.  This 
assumption will be relaxed in Section 4.  The inverse demand curve in the importing-
country market is given by: 
 bQap −= ,        (1) 
where p is price, Q is the total quantity produced and a and b are positive constants.  Total 
output is:  
 *
N M
i k
i k
Q q q= +∑ ∑ ,        (2) 
where iq  is the output of the typical MNE located in the host country and 
*
kq  is the output 
of the typical foreign firm located in the importing country.  The rent that a typical MNE 
obtains from its production in the host country is given by: 
 ( )i i i iF p w q FΠ π= − = − − ,        (3) 
where πi represent the firm’s variable profit.  The profits of the k-th importing-country firm 
are:  
 * *( )k kp qπ ω= − . (4) 
 The typical union in the host country is assumed to be interested in maximising labour 
rents and has utility function: 
 iii qwu = ,  (5) 
where we have normalised the non-union wage at zero. 
 We model the interaction between agents as a three stage game.  In stage one, entry of 
MNEs into the host country occurs until the profits of the entrants are driven to zero.  In the 
second stage each MNE bargains over the wage with a union representing its workforce.  
Finally, the MNEs and the importing-country firms choose their outputs simultaneously in a 
Cournot manner.  
 The third-stage first-order condition for a typical MNE is given by:  
 5
 0i ip bq w− − =          (6) 
and the first-order condition for a representative importing-country firm is: 
 * 0kp bq ω− − = .  (7) 
Combine equations (6) and (7) to give the Cournot-Nash equilibrium: 
 
*
( 1) ,
( 1)
( 1) .
( 1)
a M w Mq
b N M
a N Nwq
b N M
ω
ω
− + +
=
+ +
− + +
=
+ +
         (8) 
In stage two, the unions and the MNEs bargain over the wage.  We model this as the 
outcome of a Nash bargaining process6.  As firms and their unions bargain over wages 
simultaneously, they view the wages set by other firms as fixed.  Thus, firm i and union i 
solve the following problem:  
 10,u)w(Bmax 1iiiwi
≤≤= − απ αα ,     (9) 
where α is the bargaining power of the union, subject to:  
 
( ) ( 1)
( 1)
i j
i
a N M w N w M
q
b N M
ω− + + − +
=
+ +
.           (10) 
Equation (10) gives the output of firm i as a function of its own wage and the wages of all 
other multinationals, and the importing country’s marginal cost.  This can be interpreted as 
firm i’s perceived labour demand function. Given identical MNEs and unions, the solution 
to the bargaining process implies the symmetric wage: 
 ( ) ,
( 1)
a Mw
N M M
ω γ
γ
+
=
+ + +
       (11) 
where γ=α/(2-α).  The parameter γ, which lies between zero and one,  is a measure of the 
relative bargaining power of unions.  In stage two the number of firms is given, and w is 
increasing in γ.  
 In stage one, the MNEs enter the host country until the profits of the firms located 
there are driven to zero.  Make use of (6), the first-order condition for the typical MNE, in 
                                                          
6  For simplicity we assume that the conflict payoffs of the firms and unions are zero.  
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the zero profit condition 0i Fπ − = to get bq
2=F.  Hence, the equilibrium MNE output per 
firm is: 
 bFq = .        (12) 
It is clear from (12) that the output of a multinational that locates in the host-country is 
independent of the bargaining power of unions.  However, bargaining power will affect the 
number of MNEs that eventually locate.  This is captured by the following derivative7  
 2
( )( 1)( 1) 0
( ) ( 1)
dN N M N M M
d N M Mγ γ
+ + + +
= − <
+ − +
,      (13) 
which implies that an increase in the bargaining power of unions reduces the number of 
MNEs entering the country.  
 
3.  Welfare  
We now turn to the welfare analysis.  In particular, we wish to examine how varying labour 
standards, in the form of changes in the degree of union power, affect the welfare of both 
the host and the importing countries.  Changes in γ can be thought of as resulting from 
government actions, such as labour market reforms.    
 It will be informative to derive the optimal value of the bargaining power parameter, 
as if chosen by the government before the FDI decisions are made.  Given that one of our 
objectives is to determine whether a conflict of interest might arise between the two 
countries with respect to labour standards, we shall determine the optimal γ both from the 
point of view of the host country and from the point of view of the importing country.  
Note, however, that we shall not limit the analysis to the optimal values of γ, i.e. we shall 
not always choose to model governments as players in a four stage game.  To do so would 
be both unrealistic – because it would imply that the unions’ bargaining power is 
completely under the control of the policy authorities – and unnecessarily restrictive, 
because it would prevent us from highlighting the existence of either conflict or congruence 
of interest between the host and importing countries’ governments over the whole range of 
this parameter.   
                                                          
7  Equation (13) is obtained by combining (8) and (11), substituting into (12) and then using the implicit 
function theorem. 
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 Given that the host country exports all its output to the importing country, its welfare 
is just total labour rents: 
 W=Nu=Nwq,      (14) 
whereas in the importing country it is:  
 ( )* * *W CS M qπ δω= + + ,  (15) 
where CS is the consumer surplus enjoyed in the importing country.  The weight 0≤δ≤1 
reflects the importance that the government attaches to employment.  For instance, if δ=1, 
there is unemployment in the importing country and the entire cost of production *qω  is 
assumed to be the income of workers who would remain unemployed otherwise.  Thus, in 
general, the social opportunity cost of output is (1-δ)ωq*.  Only if δ=0, does ω represent the 
true marginal opportunity cost of output in the economy.  This is more likely to be the case 
if there is a tight labour market.   
 We proceed by totally differentiating the host country’s welfare function to get: 
 )NdwwdN(qdW += . (16) 
As the equilibrium output per firm q is constant, from (12), changes in the level of welfare 
can only occur if the wage or the number of MNEs (i.e. the host country market structure) 
change.  Make use of the fact that, from combining (8) and (11), 
)MN/()1MN(bqw +++= γ , so as to write: 
 ( 1)
( ) ( )
dw bq dNN M
d N M N M d
γ
γ γ
⎡ ⎤
= + + −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ . (17) 
From (17) it is clear that an increase in γ  will raise the wage in two ways: the first term in 
square brackets captures the direct effect; the second term captures the indirect effect that 
goes through a reduction of the equilibrium number of firms.  The fall in N increases each 
MNE’s monopoly power in the product market and thus increases the potential for unions’ 
rent extraction.  Stronger union bargaining power raises the wage for a given number of 
MNEs.  However, it will also work to deter investment, reducing the number of firms and 
hence employment in the high wage MNE sector.  The equilibrium number of host country 
firms N(γ) reaches a maximum at N0=N(0) and a minimum at N1=N(1).8   
                                                          
8 It can be shown that:  0 ( 1)N T M= − + where 
1/ 2( )( )T a M bFω −= + .  Hence, for N≥1, we need T≥M+2.  
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 To find the optimal level of γ from the point of view of the host country, proceed by 
making use of (17) in (16) to obtain: 
 2 ( 1)
( ) 1
dW N M N dNbq
d N M M d
γ
γ γ
⎡ ⎤+ +
= −⎢ ⎥+ +⎣ ⎦ . (18) 
It is straightforward to show that the host-country welfare is concave in γ.  At γ close to 
zero the right-hand side of (18) is positive, hence the optimal level of γ is positive; it is not 
optimal to reduce the union bargaining power to zero.  Moreover, despite the concavity of 
W(γ),  there may not be an interior solution.  To see this, note that at γ equal to unity, the 
right-hand side of (18) is positive if at that level of bargaining power the expression in 
square brackets is negative.  
Proposition 1:   
 The optimal level of the bargaining power parameter γ in the host country  
 (i) is given by:  
( )min 1,
( 1)( 1)
o N N M
M N M
γ ⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠    (19) 
and  
(ii) is  less than unity iff: 2 21 12 1 0M M N N+ + + − > .  
An interior solution (i.e. one in which γo lies between zero and unity) implies that at γ=1, 
dW/dγ<0.  Part (ii) of the proposition follows from (18) and the fact that dN/dγ is negative.  
To study the factors that make an interior solution more or less likely we could consider the 
reduced form expression for N1, which is unfortunately very complicated and hence not 
readily interpretable.  Note, however, that since N0>N1, 2 20 02 1 0M M N N+ + + − > is a 
sufficient condition for 2 21 12 1 0M M N N+ + + − >  and hence for an interior solution. 
Making use of 0 ( 1)N T M= − +  (where T is defined in footnote 8) we then find that 
2(2 3) ( 1) 0T M T M+ − − + ≥  is a sufficient condition for γo<1.  Holding M constant, the 
left-hand-side of this inequality is falling in T.  Hence, γo<1 is more likely to hold the 
smaller is T and thus the higher is F and the lower is ω (see footnote 8).  A higher level of 
M usually works towards a larger value of  2(2 3) ( 1)T M T M+ − − +  and thus makes it 
more likely that γo<1.  The host country government will have an incentive to restrict the 
bargaining power of its unions if it is above its optimal level, that is if γ>γo (of course this 
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is only possible if γo<1, as the value of γ never exceeds unity).    The more competitive is 
the importing country’s industry relative to that in the host country – that is the larger is M, 
the lower is ω, and the larger is F (that tends to reduce N) – the more likely the host-country 
government will want to turn to restrictive legislation aimed at reducing the bargaining 
power of its unions to improve the competitiveness of the local industry.   
 Before proceeding, it is interesting to note that from the host country perspective there 
are two externalities arising from the wage bargaining of individual unions. First, when 
maximising its objective function, the individual union does not internalise the beneficial 
effect that a higher wage has on the utility of the other unions: an increase in the wage 
faced by its firm raises the other firms’ relative efficiency and, thus, the rent extraction 
ability of the other unions.   This externality tends to increase the optimal γ.  The second 
externality, which works towards a reduction in the optimal γ, arises from the fact that a 
higher wage reduces the number of firms that locate in the host country.  This arises 
because bargaining takes place after the entry decision of the MNEs and, as a result, unions 
do not internalise the effects of the wage on the number of firms.  As a result,  the host 
government has in incentive to reduce union power in order to deal with the ‘time 
consistency’ problem which stems from the sequence of the game, with the MNEs having 
to make their location decision before the wage bargaining process.   
 We now turn to the effect of host-country union bargaining power on the welfare of 
the importing country.  It is helpful to first analyse how the different components of the 
importing country’s welfare are affected by the level of labour standards in the host 
country.  To this end, it proves useful to find p and *q  as functions of q: 
 
*
 ,
1
.
( 1)
a M Nbqp
M
a Nbqq
b M
ω
ω
+ −
=
+
− −
=
+
  (20) 
Note that, from (4) and (7), profits of the typical import-competing country firm can be 
written as 2** bq=π  and labour rents are *M qδ ω . Thus, from (20), both firm and labour 
rents are decreasing in N and thus increasing in γ.  Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is 
falling in the price and thus, from (20), in γ.  Therefore, weak unions in the host (less 
developed) countries are in the interest of consumers in the importing (developed) country.  
Consumers in the importing country (assuming, as we do here, that they are only interested 
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in consumer surplus and are not moved by ethical considerations) always want lower labour 
standards in the host country, while firms and workers prefer strong unions in the host 
country.  The welfare function is a composite of these two opposing interests.  
 More formally, totally differentiate (15) making use of the fact that: ( )d CS Qdp= − to 
get: 
 ( )* * *(1 )dW Qdp M p dq q dpδ ω⎡ ⎤= − + − − +⎣ ⎦ . (21) 
It is straightforward to rewrite this as: 
 ( )* *(1 )dW Nqdp M p dqδ ω= − + − − .  (22) 
Recalling that M is exogenous and that, from (12), q is determined by F/b (which is a 
constant), it is clear that both p and *q  depend on γ only through changes in N.  It is then 
possible to use (20) and its derivatives in (22) to get:  
 ( )
*
(1 )
1
dW q dNM p bNq
d M d
δ ω
γ γ
⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦+ ,  (23) 
which has the same sign as ( )(1 )M p bNqδ ω⎡ ⎤− − −⎣ ⎦ .   Clearly, this is more likely to be 
positive the larger are (p-ω) and δ and the smaller is Nq.   The larger is (p-ω), the larger is 
the increase in the importing-country’s total profits that stems from an expansion of the 
output of its firms.  The growth in the overall market share held by the importing-country 
firms is a by-product of a fall in production in the host country that results from the stronger 
union power and consequent loss of host-country competitiveness.  The bigger is δ, (i) the 
larger are labour rents in the importing country, and (ii) the more likely will an increase in 
the bargaining power of unions in the host country (with a consequent fall in its production) 
benefit the importing country. The larger is Nq, that is the higher is the level of imports 
from the host country, the less likely that an increase in γ will raise importing-country 
welfare, and the less likely it is that the importing country will oppose low labour standards 
in the host country.  This is because the larger are imports the more consumers in the 
importing country suffer in higher prices as a result of the increase in labour costs in the 
host country.  The term in square bracket in (23) can also be rewritten as 
*( )b Mq Nq Mδω− + .  It is then clear that the derivative is positive if the market share of 
the importing country exceeds that of the host country. 
 11
 It can be shown that )(W * γ  is convex and hence there is a level of bargaining 
power that minimises importing-country welfare9.  To find the minimum, make use of the 
fact that p=w+bq from the first-order condition of a typical MNE, and the fact that 
equilibrium wage can be rewritten as w=γbq(N+M+1)/(N+M), to write 
( )( )[ ] ( )MN/MN1bqbqwp ++++=+= γγ .  Use this to eliminate p in (23).  It is then 
straightforward to obtain the level of union strength (γ*min) that gives the lowest level of 
welfare from the importing country's perspective:    
 *min
0 0
0 1
1 1
if K
K if K
if K
γ
≤⎧⎪
= < ≤⎨⎪ ≥⎩
,          (24) 
where ( ) ( )1
1
N M bq MN MK
N M Mbq
δ ω− + −+
=
+ +
, and γ=K is the unrestricted mathematical 
minimum of the function.  Of course, γ, unlike K, cannot exceed unity or fall below zero.  
This is why *minγ  is not always identical to K.  When 0min* =γ , then foreign welfare is 
maximised at * 1oγ =  (where *oγ is the optimal value of γ from the importing country’s 
point of view),  and when *min 1γ =  we have * 0oγ = .  If *minγ  lies strictly between zero and 
unity, then o*γ  could lie at either extreme – zero or unity.  The importing country’s welfare 
minimising γ is more likely to be zero, and hence o*γ  is more likely to be unity, the larger 
is δ, the weight of employment in the foreign welfare function.  From now on, for 
simplicity, we will set this weight at its maximum level, i.e. assume δ=1.   
Proposition 2:  
(i)  MN0 <  is a sufficient condition for: (1) 
*minγ =0; (2) 1o* =γ ; and (3) 10 o << γ ;   
(ii) 2 1/ 21 1/ 2 (9 4 )N M M M⎡ ⎤> + +⎣ ⎦  is a sufficient condition for (1) *minγ =1; (2) 
0o* =γ ; and, provided M≥2, (3) 1o =γ . 
These two cases, that can be thought of as corresponding to a situation in which the number 
of multinationals in the host country is small/large respectively, are discussed in turn.  
 In case (i), where MN0 < ,  we get a clear divergence of interest between the host and 
the foreign importing country.  In this case, an accusation of social dumping is likely to 
arise, as the importing country would like the host country unions to have a greater 
                                                          
9   To see this, take the second derivative of the welfare function with respect to γ and evaluate it at the point at 
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bargaining power than would be optimal from the point of view of the host country 
government, that is *o oγ γ< .  This is because in the importing country the negative effect 
of social dumping on profits and labour rents is more important than the positive effect on 
its consumers. It can be shown, from proposition 1, that when MN0 <   the host 
government would not want γ=1 as this would be too harmful to the competitiveness of 
firms located there. It is easy to show that N0<M implies ( ) 01M2T <+−  (see footnote 8).  
This inequality is more likely to hold the smaller is ω, the marginal cost of the importing-
country firms, and the larger is F, the setup cost of the MNEs, that is, the higher is the 
relative cost of choosing the host country as a location10.  An improvement in outside 
options for the MNEs will raise F and make it more likely that the host government will 
wish to pursue policies that will bring a charge of social dumping.  
 In case (ii) of Proposition 2, when 2 1/ 21 1/ 2 (9 4 )N M M M⎡ ⎤> + +⎣ ⎦ , the number of 
MNEs that can be supported is sufficiently large relative to the number of the importing 
country’s firms for K to exceed unity and thus, as we have explained, for γ*o=0.  This 
condition is more likely to hold the larger is ω and the smaller is F.  In this case, the relative 
importance to the importing country’s government of profit and labour rents is now much 
lower than in case (i) above and consumer interests dominate.  In this case the importing 
country would not initiate a social dumping complaint since it is to its advantage that labour 
standards in the host country be even lower than it would be optimal for that country to 
impose.   
 
4.  Unions and endogenous wages in the importing-country 
In the interest of tractability, so far we have assumed that unions exist only in the host 
country and have treated the wage in the importing country as exogenous.  However, it is 
plausible to think of the host and the importing country as representing a developing and an 
industrial economy respectively – with the latter arguably being even more likely to be 
unionised than the former.    
 Allowing for unionisation in the importing country adds interesting dimensions to our 
analysis, not least because unions in industrialised economies perceive their rent extraction 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
which the first derivative is zero.  It is easy to check that this is positive. 
10  It is worth noting that, other things equal, a larger M does not per-se make this case more likely. If the cost 
competitiveness of the importing country’s firms is relatively low (i.e. ω is large), dN/dM is positive.  
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ability as being affected, via both trade flows and FDI, by the bargaining power of workers 
(or the lack of it) in developing countries that produce competing goods.   
 Analytically, the major implication of allowing for unions in the importing country is 
to endogenise marginal costs there.  To simplify, we assume that unions in the 
industrialised importing country have “maximum” bargaining power when setting the wage 
w*.  We continue to assume that labour is the only variable input used in production.  In 
order to allow the countries to have a different labour productivity, we continue to 
normalise the host-country labour requirement at unity, but set the labour requirement in 
the importing country at β.   
 The typical importing country firm will now have a marginal production cost of 
*
k kwω β= ,  and its  profits will be: 
 * *( )k k kp qπ ω= − . (29) 
 The typical union in the importing country is assumed to be interested in maximising 
labour rents and has a utility function:  
 * *k k ku qω= . (30) 
The union chooses *kw  (or equivalently ωk) to maximise 
*
ku , at the same time as unions in 
the host country.     
 In stage one, the MNEs anticipate wages and enter the host-country until profits from 
doing so are driven to zero. 
 The model with endogenous importing-country wages is much more complicated 
algebraically.  Hence, we needed to solve the model numerically.  Our simulations indicate 
that the effect of host-country union bargaining power on host-country welfare is 
qualitatively similar to that in the basic model.  In addition, we continue to have dN/dγ<0 
(though the exact expression is now much more complicated algebraically).  Simulations 
show that a high M and a low N0 continue to work towards an interior optimal γ.  Hence, as 
before, the stronger the competition facing the host-country (reflected in a high M), the 
stronger will be the host country government’s incentive to try to limit the bargaining 
power of domestic unions. 
 More interesting is to study how the effects of changes in host country’s union power 
on the importing country’s welfare are affected by the presence of unions in the latter. 
Modifying the importing country’s welfare to include unions’ utility: 
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 * * *( )W CS M uπ= + + , (31) 
the effect of γ on W* can now be written as: 
 [ ]
* *dW dq dMp bNq Nq
d d d
ω
γ γ γ
= − − .  (32) 
Compared to the basic model there is an additional negative term, ( )/Nq d dω γ− , on the 
right-hand-side.  An increase in bargaining power in the host country has a negative impact 
on the importing country’s welfare via an increase in its wages.  A larger γ raises w and this 
allows the unions in the importing country to raise wages.  The higher w* reduces total 
surplus in the importing country through an increase in price and a consequent fall in 
consumer surplus, and through a fall in profits.  Although importing country unions gain 
from the increase in bargaining power of unions in their trading partner, this gain is more 
than compensated by the fall in consumer surplus and profits that is due to the higher 
wages.  Thus, perhaps paradoxically, unions in the importing country and the consequent 
endogenous wages that they imply make it less likely that the importing country’s 
government will wish to charge the host country with social dumping.  An interesting 
conflict of interest emerges, however, within the importing country: whilst labour interests 
fear social dumping, consumers do not have a strong incentive to endorse arguments (which 
may often be couched in ethical terms) in favour of raising labour standards in developing 
countries.  This analysis is of course based on the simple additive welfare function in (31) 
and ignores possible political economy issues, whereby (for instance) the interest of unions 
and firms may have a stronger impact on the actions of the government than the interest of 
consumers has.  
 
5.  Summary of the Results and Conclusions 
This paper has shed light on the implications of using labour market regulation to affect the 
location decisions of multinationals.  The focus of our analysis was on (1) a (developing) 
country government’s incentive to try to affect the bargaining power of unions in an 
attempt to attract foreign direct investment and (2) the conflict of interest that might arise 
between and within countries with respect to social dumping.  
 Our results go somewhat against the conventional wisdom in suggesting that it is 
unlikely ever to be optimal for a (developing) country that tries to attract FDI to drive the 
power of its union to the lowest level possible, even though this would maximise FDI.  
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Indeed, there are circumstances in which the government may have an incentive not to 
restrict the bargaining power of unions, but rather to encourage it to the full.  These results 
ultimately reflect the trade off that the host country government faces between using its 
unions as a means of extracting rents from foreign multinationals and the desire to attract 
foreign investment to the country.  We show that the incentive to try to restrict unions’ 
degree of bargaining power will depend on the competitive position of the host country 
relative to its trading partner: the higher is the cost of production in the host country relative 
to the importing country, the more likely it is that the host country government would find 
it optimal to turn to restrictive union legislation to improve the local industry. 
 Overall, importing industrial economies will be more likely to oppose low labour 
standards in competing developing countries (1) the less exposed to (or dependent on) 
imports from the latter they are, and (perhaps surprisingly) (2) the greater the relative cost 
competitiveness of their domestic firms.11  We also found, paradoxically, that unions in the 
importing country and the consequent endogenous wages that they imply make it less likely 
than the importing country’s government will wish to charge the host country with social 
dumping. Social dumping abroad helps discipline wage demands at home. Of course, this 
analysis is based on a simple additive welfare function and in practice the interests of 
unions and firms may have a stronger impact on the actions of the government than the 
interests of the consumers have.  
 Finally, not only is the rhetoric of the arguments about international differences in 
labour standards often suggestive of a divergence of interest between industrialised and 
developing countries, but it also betrays a variety of conflicting attitudes within countries. 
Our model contributes to our understanding of these differences.   In the absence of ethical 
and/or political economy considerations, our findings suggest that a divergence of interest 
will typically emerge in importing countries between consumers, who favour social 
dumping, and firms (and their workers) which prefer unions in competing developing 
countries to be strong.   
                                                          
11 Clearly, oppositions to social dumping in this model are effectively based on strategic trade considerations 
that stem from the imperfectly competitive framework.  In a perfectly competitive model there would be no 
rent shifting incentive to oppose social dumping, because of the terms of trade improvement (which may 
explain the conventional wisdom amongst economists).    
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